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Abstract: Studies have consistently found that entrepreneurs who enter industries in
which they have prior experience as employees perform better than others. We nevertheless
know relatively little about what accounts for these differences. The presumed explanation
has generally been that these entrepreneurs benefit from the knowledge that they gained
in their former jobs. But they might also differ from other entrepreneurs on a variety of
other dimensions: Preferential access to resources or differing motivations, for example, may
account for their decisions to enter known industries instead of new ones. Combining novel
data from a representative survey of entrepreneurs in Denmark with a matched employer-
employee database of all residents in Denmark, we examined how entrepreneurs with prior
industry experience differed from those without and the extent to which these differences
could account for the performance premium associated with prior industry experience. We
found that those with industry experience came from younger, smaller and more profitable
firms, and that they recruited more experienced employees, worked harder and placed less
value on having flexible hours. The recruitment of more experienced employees and the
greater effort exerted appeared to account for at least some of the performance advantage
associated with prior industry experience.
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Scholars from a wide range of perspectives, from organization theory and strategy to eco-
nomics and finance, have long been interested in the sources of homogeneity and heterogene-
ity among young firms. Within these literatures, one of the more consistent findings has been
the fact that firms founded by entrepreneurs with prior experience in an industry appear
advantaged relative to those coming from other industries. Researchers have assigned the
organizations established by these experienced entrepreneurs a variety of names – they have
been called spinoffs, spinouts, spawn and progeny – but, regardless of the label assigned,
these firms have been found to survive longer (Phillips 2002; Agarwal et al. 2004; Dahl and
Reichstein 2007; Klepper 2007), to attain larger size (Roberts et al. 2011), to earn larger
profits (Dahl and Sorenson 2012) to attract more funding at higher valuations (Chatterji
2009), and to introduce more innovative products (Agarwal et al. 2004).
The assumption in these studies has generally been that these advantages emerge from
the transfer of knowledge from “parent” firms, the prior employers of these entrepreneurs, to
their progeny. Spinoff entrepreneurs, for example, may have had access to valuable technical
knowledge at their prior employers that they then carried with them to their new ventures
(Bhide 1994; Anton and Yao 1995; Agarwal et al. 2004). Or, these entrepreneurs might
benefit from more general knowledge about effective organizational blueprints and routines
for the industry (Phillips 2002). But the evidence in support of this mechanism remains
limited. Few studies have had direct information about the potential transfer of knowledge.
Those that did, moreover, have found that spinoffs outperform other startups even after
controlling for their better access to technical and organizational knowledge (Phillips 2002;
Agarwal et al. 2004; Chatterji 2009), suggesting that spinoffs do not benefit only from the
transfer of knowledge.
One possible explanation for this residual effect is that spinoffs also have preferential
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access to other resources: Founders with experience in the industry, for example, have social
connections that could help them to identify and recruit able early employees to their ven-
tures (Sorenson and Audia 2000). Investors may also perceive prior industry experience as
a positive signal, increasing the ability of the founders of spin-offs to raise capital (MacMil-
lan et al. 1985; Burton et al. 2002; Chatterji 2009). These financial resources, moreover,
could have a self-confirming character as they allow the firms receiving them to hire more
productive employees, to expand more rapidly and to weather temporary downturns.
Another possible explanation is that spin-off entrepreneurs differ from others in terms
of their motivations for becoming an entrepreneur. Research on entrepreneurs in general
suggests that many open their own firms for the intrinsic rewards of doing so—being one’s
own boss, being able to spend more time with family and friends, feeling a sense of accom-
plishment, etc. (e.g., Benz and Frey 2008; Wasserman 2012). Those who start businesses in
industries in which they do not have experience have made an active decision to do some-
thing different. Perhaps they did not like their jobs. Perhaps they were not good at them.
Regardless of the specific reasons underlying their choices, this process represents a form of
self-selection that may mean that spin-off entrepreneurs differ from others in terms of their
abilities and motivations.
To date, however, researchers have generally not been able to explore many of these
possibilities. Doing so requires not just detailed information about a set of startups and the
employment histories of their founders but also insight into the attitudes of these individuals.
Though numerous researchers have invested valuable effort into assembling a number of high-
quality industry-level datasets on spinouts, these databases generally have had only limited
information on each founder and therefore researchers have been severely circumscribed in
their ability to delve deeply into the mechanisms underlying the effects that they observe.
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Here, we addressed these issues by combining two unusual data sets. The first is a survey
of a representative sample of individuals who founded companies in Denmark in 2004 (N =
1361), which asked entrepreneurs a variety of questions about their motivations for starting
a business and the degree to which they received assistance from their social connections.
Statistics Denmark has linked this cross-sectional survey to a second, longitudinal, employer-
employee database, which allowed us to establish the employment histories of these founders,
to identify their early employees and to assess the performance of their ventures.
We found that spinoff entrepreneurs differed from those entering industries in which
they did not have experience on multiple dimensions: They had less managerial experience
than non-spinoff entrepreneurs; they came from smaller, younger and more profitable parent
firms; they recruited fewer family members and more former colleagues to their startups as
employees than non-spinoff entrepreneurs; and they placed less value on flexible hours and
on some of the intrinsic rewards related to self-employment.
As in prior single-industry studies, Danish spinoff entrepreneurs, on average, enjoyed a
substantial performance advantage over non-spinoff entrepreneurs. However, of the numerous
differences identified between the two types of entrepreneurs, only a few correlated with the
performance of their ventures: Having a more experienced workforce and being willing to
work harder both explained a portion of the performance differences between spinoff and
non-spinoff entrepreneurs. Our results nonetheless suggest that multiple factors – including
selection and social capital – play a role in the performance advantages accorded to prior
industry experience.
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The spinoff advantage
Numerous labels – such as spinoffs, spinouts, spawn and progeny – have been used to refer
to companies founded by those with prior experience in the industry. For clarity, we use
the term “spinoff” to refer to this phenomenon.1 The exact definitions of who qualifies
as a spinoff entrepreneur have also varied across studies. Some have categorized as spinoffs
only those who had worked for an existing firm in the industry immediately prior to founding
their venture (e.g., Phillips 2002; Agarwal et al. 2004). Others have included those with prior
experience in the industry at any earlier point in their careers (e.g., Klepper 2007; Chatterji
2009). In some cases, any prior experience within the industry qualified an entrepreneur as
being a spinoff (e.g., Phillips 2002; Chatterji 2009); in other cases, this definition required
prior managerial experience in the industry (e.g., Agarwal et al. 2004; Klepper 2007). Though
our results remain robust to any of these definitions, being a spinoff entrepreneur in the
analyses reported here refers to the broadest of these possible definitions: having previously
been employed, at some point between 1980 and 2003, in any capacity in another firm in the
same four-digit industry as one’s startup.2
Regardless of the specific definition, a large and growing number of studies have found
that spinoffs perform better than other startups. In one of the first studies on this topic,
Phillips (2002), for example, found that Silicon Valley law firms formed by a former partner
from an existing Silicon Valley law firm enjoyed 44% lower failure rates than those founded by
other lawyers. Subsequent studies have found that spinoffs experience lower failure rates than
1Note, however, that some prior studies, such as Eriksson and Kuhn (2006), have nevertheless used the
term “spinoff” as a label for entrepreneurs who may or may not have any prior industry experience. Eriksson
and Kuhn (2006) and Muendler and Rauch (2011), for example, use it to refer to teams of founders who
previously worked with each other (in any industry).
2Though our data did not allow us to track individuals prior to 1980, less than 20% of the respondents
had left-censored employment histories.
5
other startups in a wide variety of industries, from automobiles (Boschma and Wenting 2007;
Klepper 2007) and disk drive manufacturing (Agarwal et al. 2004) to fashion design (Wenting
2008), and that they also appear to outperform non-spinoffs on operational measures of
performance (e.g., Agarwal et al. 2004; Chatterji 2009).
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Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier survival plot for spinoffs (light) and non-spinoffs (dark)
Though multi-industry studies have been scarce (for exceptions, see Dahl and Reichstein
2007 and Dencker et al. 2009), this phenomenon appears quite general. Figure 1, for example,
provides a Kaplan-Meier plot for the failure rates, over their first four years of operation,
for all startups in Denmark founded between 1995 and 2004 (N = 6799). The upper line
plots the cumulative survival rate for spinoffs (with the shaded region depicting the 90%
confidence interval for the estimate) – firms in which the founder had prior experience in
the same four-digit industry as his or her startup – while the lower line plots the same curve
for non-spinoffs. On average, over the first four years of their lives, spinoffs enjoyed survival
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rates roughly ten percentage points higher than non-spinoffs. This gap in survival rates
between spinoffs and non-spinoffs in Denmark emerges quickly, within only a few months of
founding, and persists without any obvious erosion as firms mature.
Despite the ubiquity of the finding that spinoff entrepreneurs outperform those entering
from outside the industry, the factors underlying this effect remain an open question. We
see three broad classes of mechanisms that might account for these effects: (i) Spinoff en-
trepreneurs may bring valuable intellectual capital with them to their ventures (knowledge);
(ii) spinoff entrepreneurs may have valuable social capital that assists them in building suc-
cessful organizations (reputation and relationships); and (iii) selection in who decides to
become an entrepreneur in an industry in which they have worked may distinguish spinoff
entrepreneurs in terms of their abilities and in terms of the effort they exert (motivations).
Our approach to exploring which of these factors matter most has been first to examine
how spinoff entrepreneurs and their companies differ from non-spinoff entrepreneurs using
information from the survey and the employer-employee database (described in detail in the
Appendix). If spinoff and non-spinoff entrepreneurs do not differ on some dimension, then
that factor cannot account for the superior performance of spinoff entrepreneurs (though that
factor might have its own independent effects on firm performance). After isolating those
dimensions on which the two types of entrepreneurs vary, we then regressed those factors on
performance to explore the extent to which they might account for the spinoff advantage.
Knowledge
Perhaps the most commonly presumed explanation for the high performance of spinoff en-
trepreneurs has been their superior access to private information and/or tacit knowhow
relevant to the industry. Researchers have nevertheless differed substantially in the kinds of
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knowledge that they have highlighted as important. One group of studies, mostly from orga-
nizational scholars, has pointed to the importance of managerial knowhow. Phillips (2002),
for example, argued that founders with prior experience in the industry have access to ef-
fective organizational blueprints that they can use to establish more effective and reliable
routines in their fledgling firms. He further reasoned that these blueprints would be most
valuable when they came from larger, older and more successful firms, since the success and
stability of these parent firms suggest that they had more effective blueprints at their core.
Consistent with these arguments, Phillips (2002) found that law firms founded by former
partners of existing law firms had lower exit rates than those started by attorneys without
managerial experience. He also found that spinoffs from more successful and larger parents
performed better.
Interestingly, others, using a similar logic, have contended that spinoff founders coming
from smaller, younger firms should have an advantage. The key difference in the assumptions
behind these diverging expectations has to do with the nature of the managerial problem:
Whereas those in the first group, such as Phillips (2002), assume that the same blueprints
should ensure success for the young and the old, the large and the small, the second group
has begun with a belief that running a startup raises its own unique set of managerial
challenges. As a result, entrepreneurs should benefit more from employment experience in
small firms than in large ones (cf. Lazear 2005). Consistent with this assumption and its
implication, Sørensen and Phillips (2011), studying a cross-section of Danish startups, found
that organizations started by entrepreneurs who had previously been employed at smaller
firms both survived longer and earned more money.
A second group of studies, mostly from economists and students of strategy and focused
more on high-technology industries, has emphasized the importance of technical knowledge.
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Agarwal et al. (2004), for example, argued that spinoff entrepreneurs benefit from preferential
access to the tacit knowledge underlying the products and technologies of their former em-
ployers. Analyzing data from the hard disk drive industry, they found that spinoffs produced
drives closer to the technological frontier – with higher areal densities and more frequently
using the most recent form factors – than non-spinoffs. Even among spinoffs, those whose
founders had experience in parent firms with cutting-edge technology entered with more
advanced products themselves. Subsequent studies have similarly found strong associations
between the technological positions of parents and their progeny in lasers (Klepper and
Sleeper 2005), medical devices (Chatterji 2009) and electronics (Yang et al. 2010).
To assess the extent to which spinoff entrepreneurs might benefit from better access to
knowledge, we began by comparing their answers to those of non-spinoff entrepreneurs on
three relevant questions from the survey.3 Entrepreneurs indicated the extent to which they
considered industry experience, managerial experience and “being an expert” as important
to the success of their businesses, choosing either “very important,” “important,” or “not
important” as a response. The upper panel of Table 1 compares the mean responses provided
by spinoff entrepreneurs versus non-spinoff entrepreneurs and the Mann-Whitney p-value for
the probability that the difference between these means reflects a true difference in the
underlying population means.4
The fourth column reports the coefficient for an ordered logit regression with the ques-
tion responses as a dependent variable and the number of years of prior experience in the
same four-digit industry (i.e. 0 for non-spinoffs) as the only regressor. Note that the mean
differences and the ordered logit coefficient do not convey the same information. Whereas
3Please note that the original survey had been implemented in Danish. The questions and answers
reported in the paper represent our own translations into English.
4The Mann-Whitney test does not require an assumption of normality. It therefore offers a more appro-
priate test of the difference in means between two ordinal measures than a t-test.
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the mean differences depend more on the distinction between spinoff and non-spinoff en-
trepreneurs, the ordered logit coefficients also depend on the extent to which those with
more experience in the same industry differ from those with less. The final column reports
the number of valid cases for each question or measure.
Table 1: Bivariate associations for measures of knowledge
Mean Mean Mann-Whitney Ordered N
(Spinoff) (Other) p-value logit (of 1,361)
How important do you find industry experience 2.57 2.39 0.000∗∗ 0.065 1,209
to the success of your business? (0.014)∗∗
How important do you find managerial experience 1.99 1.99 0.984 -0.010 1,176
to the success of your business? (0.012)
How important do you find being an expert or 1.96 1.81 0.001∗∗ 0.050 1,178
specialist a key to the success of your business? (0.012)
Mean Mean t-test Poisson N
(Spinoff) (Other) p-value (of 1,361)
Labor market experience (years) 14.7 15.1 0.481 0.047 1,361
(0.007)∗∗
Industry experience, 4-digit (years) 6.47 0.00 1,361
Related industry experience (years) 2.48 1.98 0.036∗ 0.064 1,361
(0.019)∗∗
Top management team experience (years) 0.46 0.73 0.037∗ -0.076 1,361
(0.038)∗
Parent firm age 15.1 20.3 0.000∗∗ -0.122 1,158
(0.008)∗∗
Parent firm size (5-year average number of employees) 718 1934 0.000∗∗ -0.719 1,162
(0.001)∗∗
Parent firm returns over assets1 0.99 0.25 0.000∗∗ 0.005 1,162
(5-year average) (0.002)∗
Both spinoff and non-spinoff entrepreneurs considered industry experience important.
In both groups, “very important” represents the modal response. Spin-off entrepreneurs
nevertheless felt more strongly about the value of industry experience and expertise. By
contrast, though both groups also viewed managerial experience as important, they did not
differ noticeably in their opinions. These perceptions, however, may represent an ex post
rationalization of the choices that entrepreneurs had already made.
The lower panel of the table then compares spinoff and non-spinoff entrepreneurs on
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several objective measures of their employment experience.5 Spinoff entrepreneurs did not
differ from other entrepreneurs in terms of their overall level of experience (p = .481); labor
market experience counts the number of years that the individual had been employed at any
job prior to founding a firm. They did, however, differ in terms of the industries in which they
had experience. Of course, by definition, spinoff entrepreneurs had more industry experience
than non-spinoff entrepreneurs: Industry experience counts the number of years in which the
entrepreneur had previously worked for a firm classified in the same four-digit industry as
his or her startup; on average, spinoff entrepreneurs had roughly 6.5 years of experience in
the industry before starting their ventures. But not only did spinoff entrepreneurs have more
industry experience, they also had more experience in related industries – related industry
experience counts the number of years that entrepreneurs had been employed in firms in the
same two-digit (but different four-digit) industry as their current ventures – an average of
2.5 years (versus 2 years for non-spinoff entrepreneurs).
Interestingly, spinoff entrepreneurs had less managerial experience than non-spinoff en-
trepreneurs. Top management team experience tallies the number of years that entrepreneurs
had been employed in the senior-most ranks of employees at their prior employers. Whereas
spinoff entrepreneurs had .46 years in the managerial ranks, on average, non-spinoff en-
trepreneurs had nearly 50% more (.73 years). That’s somewhat surprising given the fact
that numerous accounts have highlighted prior managerial experience as one of the factors
favoring spinoff entrepreneurs (e.g., Phillips 2002; Dencker et al. 2009).
The final three variables compare the characteristics of the previous employers of spinoff
and non-spinoff entrepreneurs. Spinoff entrepreneurs tended to come from younger firms
5Because the measures in the lower half of the table represent continuous counts, we used t-tests to
compare the means and we regressed the (logged) number of years of industry experience (plus one) on these
measures using Poisson regression.
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(an average of 15 years old versus more than 20 years for non-spinoffs), smaller firms (718
employees, on average, versus nearly two thousand employees) and more profitable firms (in
terms of return on assets).6 Those facts seem somewhat more consistent with the idea that
startups pose their own managerial challenges than with the idea that proven organizational
blueprints work best for all firms at all stages of maturity.
Reputation and relationships
Though spinoff entrepreneurs undoubtedly do accrue industry-specific human capital from
their prior experience in the industry, they also acquire industry-specific social capital, in the
form of a reputation and relationships. Several factors suggest that this social capital might
also prove valuable, in particular in assembling the necessary resources for a new venture.
Investors, employees, buyers and suppliers all face a great deal of fundamental uncertainty
when trying to determine whether to invest in or to do business with a fledgling firm. Is the
idea good? Does the entrepreneur have the ability to run a firm? Will customers buy in?
Social capital often allows entrepreneurs to overcome this uncertainty. Would-be investors or
early employees, for example, may view prior employment as a form of endorsement. Some
firms have a reputation for attracting and developing high-quality employees. Having been
an employee at one of them therefore suggests a certain level of competence and promise.
Burton et al. (2002), for example, found that entrepreneurs from firms that had a reputation
for producing spinoffs had a higher probability of receiving financing from venture capitalists
(see also Higgins and Gulati 2003; Chatterji 2009). Not only might these reputations prove
valuable to securing funding, but also they may help to convince skeptical potential employees
to join fledgling firms.
6Gompers et al. (2005) reported similar results analyzing spinoffs from a sample of public firms in the
United States.
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In addition to their reputations, spinoff entrepreneurs may also benefit from their direct
connections to others in the industry. Workplaces provide settings in which individuals meet
and interact with one another. Coworkers quite commonly become friends. Feld (1981),
for example, reported that workplaces accounted for a larger proportion of friendships in
America than any source other than family.
Friends and colleagues tend to have more favorable beliefs about one another than those
without such personal connections. Obviously, selection means that these connections most
commonly form among those who hold each other in higher regard. But psychological biases
also reinforce this tendency. Mere contact generates positive affect and therefore positive
beliefs about others (Sorenson and Waguespack 2006). And confirmation biases mean that
friends often disregard information that should lead them to believe otherwise (Wason 1968).
These favorable perceptions, therefore, help to assuage potential employees’ concerns about
the prospects of joining friends’ companies. Not surprisingly then, family, friends and former
colleagues account for a large proportion of the early employees of entrepreneurial ventures—
Ruef (2010), for example, reports that they represented 95% of the members of founding
teams in a representative sample of startups in the United States.
Of course, the hiring of family, friends and former colleagues in general has somewhat
ambiguous implications for firm performance. On the positive side, it allows entrepreneurs
to avoid adverse selection in the labor market (Montgomery 1991). They need not rely
simply on those looking for a job. Hiring those they know may also engender trust within
the organization and facilitate the establishment of organizational routines (Phillips 2002;
Timmermans 2010, 2012). Timmermans (2012), for example, found that startups staffed
by employees with more prior experience with one another had significantly higher survival
rates than those comprised of strangers. But on the negative side, entrepreneurs’ favorable
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opinions of these individuals may lead them to hire or promote family, friends and former
colleagues ahead of others more qualified.
Spinoff entrepreneurs nevertheless have an added advantage in hiring their former col-
leagues. Namely, these individuals have experience in the industry and therefore can bring
valuable industry-specific human capital to the venture. Prior experience in the industry
therefore gives these individuals preferential access to the pool of employees with the highest
expected productivity (Sorenson and Audia 2000).
Table 2 explores whether spinoff and non-spinoff entrepreneurs differed in their access to
financial resources and in whom they hired. The upper panel, once again, reports data from
the survey. Spinoff entrepreneurs did not differ markedly in their access to financial capital,
either from family and friends (p = .535) or from venture capitalists (p = .796). They did,
however, report substantial differences in their recruiting patterns: Spinoff entrepreneurs
relied less on family to staff their ventures but more on former colleagues.
The lower panel, reporting registry data, tells a similar story. Spinoff entrepreneurs did
not have access to greater personal financial resources, either in terms of their own wealth
(p = .581) or that of their parents (p = .905); these measures capture the total net worth,
respectively, of entrepreneurs’ and entrepreneurs’ parents households in Danish kroner. Nor
did they differ in terms of their average tenure in the region – the number of years during
which the individual resided in the same township as their startup – a measure of regional
embeddedness previously found to benefit firm performance (Dahl and Sorenson 2012).
But they did recruit different early employees. The next four variables in the table
characterize the employees hired by entrepreneurs in their first year of operations. Employee
labor market experience counts the number of years of prior experience the employees had,
on average, in any industry; employee 4-digit industry experience tallies the number of those
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Table 2: Bivariate associations for measures of resources
Mean Mean Mann-Whitney Ordered N
(Spinoff) (Other) p-value logit (of 1,361)
Did you receive a loan or investment from 1.14 1.16 0.535 -0.876 1,056
family, friends or other acquaintances? (0.032)∗∗
Did you receive financing from venture capitalists? 1.02 1.02 0.796 -0.076 1,017
(0.085)
How many of the initial employees were...
... close family? 1.20 1.29 0.030∗ -0.069 595
(0.025)∗∗
... other family? 1.03 1.06 0.096† -0.143 578
(0.081)†
... former colleagues? 1.41 1.23 0.000∗∗ 0.025 586
(0.020)
... other friends or acquaintances? 1.18 1.17 0.975 -0.071 584
(0.033)∗
Mean Mean T-test Poisson N
(Spinoff) (Other) Pr-value (of 1,361)
Household wealth1 206,238 234,851 0.581 7,338.2 1,361
(5,642.7)
Parent wealth1 620,084 640,078 0.905 -436.8 1,361
(18,150)
Region tenure (years) 4.86 4.52 0.337 0.091 1,361
(0.013)∗∗
Employee labor market experience (years) 3.70 2.55 0.001∗∗ 0.206 1,361
(0.015)∗∗
Employee 4-digit industry experience (years) 1.42 0.22 0.000∗∗ 0.873 1,361
(0.031)∗∗
Employee region tenure (years) 1.98 1.27 0.001∗∗ 0.219 1,361
(0.021)∗∗
Common experience (years) 0.47 0.30 0.052† 0.294 1,361
(0.042)∗∗
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years of experience in which the employees had been employed by firms classified in the same
four-digit industry as the startup; employee region tenure measures the average number of
years that employees had lived in the same township as the startup; and common experience
captures the average number of years of experience that each employee had working with the
founder prior to joining the startup. The employees recruited by spinoff entrepreneurs had
more overall work experience, more experience in the same four-digit industry as the venture
(nearly seven times as much!), more common experience as a coworker with the entrepreneur
and more experience living in the region. The employees that spinoff entrepreneurs hired
therefore seem higher quality than those hired by non-spinoff entrepreneurs.
Motivation
Spin-off entrepreneurs may also have different reasons for becoming an entrepreneur from
those starting businesses in industries that they do not know. This possibility has been a
central theme in much of the descriptive and theoretical research on spinoffs. In particular,
several have sought to answer the question: Why do employees spin out on their own rather
than remaining with their former employers? Two motives have mainly been suggested: (i)
disagreements, and (ii) expropriation.
The idea of disagreements has a long history. Garvin (1983), in his early article describ-
ing spinoffs, suggested anecdotally that many spinoff entrepreneurs appeared to have had
disagreements with the management of their former employers about the future direction of
their industries or of the products being developed by their employers. They therefore left to
pursue the products and strategies that their former employers rejected. Several papers have
developed this idea more rigorously in the context of formal models where these disagree-
ments emerge either because incumbent firms have different incentives for pursuing projects
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(e.g., Cassiman and Ueda 2006) or because their managers have less accurate perceptions of
the value of novel ideas than would-be entrepreneurs (e.g., Klepper and Sleeper 2005; Klep-
per and Thompson 2010). These models suggest that spinoff entrepreneurs should pursue
more innovative and more profitable ideas than non-spinoff entrepreneurs.
Other models suggest that entrepreneurs leave their former employers to profit from the
human and intellectual capital that they gained from their tenure in these firms. Anton and
Yao (1995), for example, developed a model in which employees who discover potentially
profitable ideas may exit the firm to pursue them on their own. Since their employers do
not have enforceable property rights over the inventions, these employees stand to gain more
financially from founding their own firms. From these models, one might expect money to
motivate spinoff entrepreneurs more than non-spinoff entrepreneurs.
The choice problem in these literatures, however, has been: Why do employees leave their
employers? It has essentially been assumed that if they do leave their employers that they
will nevertheless remain in the same industry. But clearly many entrepreneurs also start
businesses in other industries. Given that these entrepreneurs, too, have presumably gained
valuable industry-specific expertise, this decision to shift to another industry seems a bit
of a puzzle. We nevertheless see at least two possible factors that might account for these
decisions. First, they may have relatively low expected returns to staying in their industries.
Non-spinoff entrepreneurs may have discovered through experience that they do not have the
abilities or attributes required to succeed in an industry. Or, the industry as a whole may
have poor prospects. The systematic removal of poor performers from the population may
therefore account for the superior performance of spinoff entrepreneurs. Studies of firm-level
diversification, for example, similarly suggest that adverse selection may account for the
diversification discount—firms enter new markets because their home markets offer limited
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prospects for future growth (Ushijima 2002; Villalonga 2005).
Second, non-spinoff entrepreneurs may have decided for some (non-pecuniary) reason that
they did not like their jobs. Job satisfaction depends on a bundle of extrinsic and intrinsic
rewards. Individuals differ in the extent to which they value these rewards (Kalleberg 1977).
Some care about money; others may prefer a job with flexible hours, so that they can spend
time with family and friends or pursuing their hobbies; still others may want a job that they
find intellectually stimulating or emotionally fulfilling. Non-spinoff entrepreneurs may have
discovered that something about the nature of their former job did not fit well with their
preferences and therefore have decided to pursue a different career in a different industry,
more in line with their interests. Those choices moreover may lead them to start businesses
with less promising financial prospects (because those businesses offer compensating rewards
on other dimensions).
In assessing motivations, the survey proves critical. Though the Danish registry data
can provide insight into the prior employment experience and the resource mobilization of
all entrepreneurs, assessing their motivations requires information on their attitudes and
motivations. Table 3 reports the responses of spinoff and non-spinoff entrepreneurs to a
variety of questions meant to assess their reasons for starting their ventures and their interest
in various forms of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards.
The first nine questions asked entrepreneurs to choose either “very important,” “im-
portant,” or “not important” as a response. Beginning with the first question, spinoff en-
trepreneurs and non-spinoff entrepreneurs displayed almost no difference in the extent to
which they reported disagreements with management as a reason for starting their busi-
nesses (p = .474); most, moreover, considered it unimportant to their decision to found
a firm. Spinoff and non-spinoff entrepreneurs also did not appear to differ in the extent
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Table 3: Bivariate associations for measures of motivation
Mean Mean Mann-Whitney Ordered N
(Spinoff) (Other) p-value logit (of 1,361)
How important were disagreements with colleagues 1.37 1.34 0.474 0.040 855
or management for your decision to start a business? (0.017)∗
How important is it that your job provides a high 2.04 2.01 0.484 0.002 1,323
income? (0.013)
How important was unemployment or a resignation 1.40 1.61 0.000∗∗ -0.025 751
to your decision to start a business? (0.020)
How important is it that your job fits your skills 2.28 2.36 0.040∗ -0.027 1,317
and abilities? (0.013)∗
How important is it that your job strengthens your 2.44 2.41 0.418 -0.000 1,338
skills and abilities? (0.012)
How important is it that you find your work interesting? 2.70 2.72 0.496 -0.032 1,345
(0.013)
How important is it that your work involves a variety 2.53 2.49 0.339 0.014 1,338
of tasks? (0.013)
How important is it that your job allows for 1.71 1.78 0.047∗ -0.024 1,331
vacation and leisure time? (0.012)†
How important is it that your job has flexible hours? 1.89 2.00 0.006∗∗ -0.025 1,314
(0.012)∗
Within the last five years, have you been unable to 2.62 2.43 0.001∗∗ 0.017 1,321
participate in family activities due to your job? (0.012)
Within the last five years, have you been unable to 3.07 2.93 0.006∗∗ 0.015 1,322
contribute to household chores due to your job? (0.012)
Within the last five years, has your job required you 3.20 3.02 0.001∗∗ 0.012 1,323
to work during vacation or holidays? (0.012)
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to which they cited the potential for material rewards as a motivation (p = .905), though
here both groups considered it important, on average. Those responses therefore raise some
questions as to the extent to which the existing formal models of spinoff entrepreneurship
capture the actual dynamics of entrepreneurial decisions.
There appears to be more evidence that spinoff and non-spinoff entrepreneurs differ on
other motivational dimensions. For example, the responses to two different questions suggest
that non-spinoff entrepreneurs may have actively chosen not to stay in their industries,
either due to the attractiveness of those industries or due to their poor fit with them. Non-
spinoff entrepreneurs reported that a spell of unemployment more commonly influenced their
decision to become entrepreneurs and also indicated that they placed greater importance on
having a job that fit with their skills and abilities (despite changing industries).
With respect to the importance of the non-pecuniary characteristics of their jobs, the two
groups did not seem to differ in terms of the importance of self-fulfillment. Both considered
it critical that they find their work interesting and that they have varied tasks.
But the two groups did differ substantially in the extent to which they cared about
work intruding in other domains of their lives. Non-spinoff entrepreneurs placed greater
importance on having more flexible hours and on having jobs that would accommodate
leisure and vacation time. Their self-reports of the extent to which their entrepreneurial
ventures infringed on their personal lives revealed consistent patterns. On the final three
questions, respondents had to indicate “regularly,” “occasionally,” “rarely” or “never” as an
answer to each question. Spinoff entrepreneurs reported that their jobs more frequently led
them to miss out on family activities and to neglect household duties and to work during
holidays and vacation. Spinoff entrepreneurs therefore appear to work in less flexible jobs
and/or to work harder to ensure the success of their ventures.
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Distinguishing characteristics
Though the preceding section discussed factors that appear to distinguish spinoff and non-
spinoff entrepreneurs, it did so one variable at a time. Many of these factors nevertheless
probably correlate with one another or depend on some common antecedent. To isolate
those factors most important to differentiating spinoff entrepreneurs from other founders,
we moved to a multivariate analysis.
Table 4 introduces the various variables above into a logit model of whether or not the
entrepreneur entered an industry in which s/he had prior experience (i.e. whether the venture
qualified as a spinoff). We introduced these variables in three groups based on the three
classes of mechanisms discussed above. Because variables that did not differ significantly in
their distributions across founder types should not predict the likelihood of being a spinoff,
we only included those factors that had either a significant difference in their means across
the groups or a significant estimated relationship with industry experience in the ordered
logit or Poisson.7 In the final column, Model 4, we included only factors that had a significant
coefficient in one of the first three models.
In the multivariate analysis, a number of factors with significant bivariate associations
dropped out as being useful predictors of entrepreneur type. Several nevertheless remain:
Among the measures of knowledge, spinoff entrepreneurs had more related industry expe-
rience but less managerial experience. They also came from smaller, younger and more
profitable firms. With respect to access to resources, all of the measures of financial re-
sources became insignificant, controlling for other factors. Spinoff entrepreneurs, however,
7To ensure that the lack of a bivariate association did not depend on some suppressor relationship with
a third variable, we also ran a version of Table 4 with all of the variables. None of the variables with
insignificant bivariate associations with founder type had a significant coefficient at the .05 level in the
multivariate analysis.
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Table 4: Estimates of likelihood of being a spin-off
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Labor market experience (years) 0.003
(0.007)
Related industry experience, 2-digit (years) 0.034∗ 0.037∗∗
(0.014) (0.014)
Top management experience (years) -0.071∗ -0.055†
(0.033) (0.032)
Parent firm age -0.011∗∗ -0.011∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Parent firm size (5 yr avg) -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Parent firm return on assets (5 yr avg) 1.586∗∗ 1.327∗∗
(0.348) (0.357)
Did you receive a loan or investment from -0.061
family, friends or other acquaintances? (0.153)
How many of the initial employees were -0.486∗ -0.341
close family? (0.214) (0.214)
How many of the initial employees were 0.604∗∗ 0.636∗∗
former colleagues? (0.162) (0.166)
How many of the initial employees were 0.147
other friends and acquaintances? (0.213)
Region tenure (years) 0.001
(0.010)
Employee labor market experience (years) -0.045∗∗ -0.042∗∗
(0.016) (0.014)
Employee 4-digit industry experience (years) 0.453∗∗ 0.438∗∗
(0.059) (0.061)
Employee region tenure (years) 0.010
(0.025)
Common experience (years) 0.019
(0.052)
How important were disagreements with colleagues 0.124
or management for your decision to start a business? (0.115)
How important was unemployment or a resignation -0.432∗∗ -0.254∗
to your decision to start a business? (0.117) (0.119)
How important is it that your job fits your skills -0.212∗ -0.237∗
and abilities? (0.098) (0.104)
How important is it that your job allows for -0.011
vacation and leisure time? (0.095)
How important is it that your job has flexible hours? -0.142
(0.094)
Within the last five years, have you been unable to 0.116
participate in family activities due to your job? (0.073)
Within the last five years, have you been unable to 0.066
contribute to household chores due to your job? (0.083)
Within the last five years, has your job required you 0.126† 0.153∗
to work during vacation or holidays? (0.075) (0.070)
Constant -0.593∗∗ -1.093∗∗ -0.266 -0.622
(0.119) (0.412) (0.454) (0.487)
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.11
Log-likelihood -842 -807 -853 -775
Chi-squared 63.47 133.35 40.95 197.81
Observations 1,361 1,361 1,361 1,361
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still appeared to recruit more heavily from their former colleagues, therefore also signing
early employees with more experience in the industry (though with less experience in other
industries). Interestingly, these recruiting differences had the strongest ability to distinguish
spinoff and non-spinoff entrepreneurs.
Three motivational factors also continued to distinguish spinoff entrepreneurs from others:
A spell of unemployment less frequently influenced spinoff entrepreneurs decisions to become
entrepreneurs; spinoff entrepreneurs also placed less importance on having a job that fit
their abilities and attributes; and spinoff entrepreneurs more frequently reported working on
holidays and vacations.
Performance
Even if spinoff and non-spinoff entrepreneurs differ on some dimensions, those differences
do not necessarily help to account for the performance advantage enjoyed by spinoffs unless
those factors also contribute in some way to firm performance. We therefore also explicitly
investigated the extent to which these various factors accounted for the spinoff advantage.
We began exploring the performance implications by analyzing the functional form of
the relationship between survival and years of industry experience using a flexible, non-
parametric specification. In particular, we regressed the exit rate for startups on a vector
of indicator variables for each and every possible number of years of prior experience in the
four-digit industry. By definition, the founders in all non-spinoff firms have zero years of
prior experience. Figure 2 displays the estimated coefficient for each indicator, as well as
95% confidence intervals for those estimates.
This analysis has two purposes. First, it gives us some insight into whether selection
or maturation processes contribute more strongly to the spinoff advantage. If selection
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Figure 2: Multiplier rate of exit by years of industry experience
processes dominate, then one would expect the difference to emerge with the first few years of
industry experience and then to remain relatively constant. If, on the other hand, maturation
processes – such as the accrual of human or social capital – prove paramount then one would
expect the performance differential between spinoff and non-spinoff entrepreneurs to grow
over time. From the figure, it appears that the advantage of spinoffs relative to non-spinoffs
rises with the industry experience of their founders, suggesting that some sort of maturation
process dominates (if anything selection actually seems somewhat negative, with spinoffs
with only one year of industry experience doing worse than non-spinoffs).
The second purpose is to garner some sense of the appropriate functional form for includ-
ing industry experience with other measures in the multivariate analysis of firm performance.
The individual coefficient estimates increase in magnitude but as a decreasing rate. The in-
dividual coefficients displayed do not differ significantly from the predictions produced by
24
the logged number of years (plus one to avoid logging zero). We therefore simplify the
specification to logged years of industry experience in the next set of regressions.
Table 5 then examines firm performance in a multivariate context. The first column
includes only the logged years of prior industry experience of the founder. Prior experience
has a significant and large effect on exit rates; a doubling in industry experience decreases
the failure rates of firms by 24%. Since the average spinoff entrepreneur has more than
six years of experience in the industry, he enjoys roughly 38% (= 1− e−.235×ln(6.47+1)) lower
failure rates than the average non-spinoff entrepreneur.
Table 5: Estimates of startup exit rates
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Industry experience, 4-digit (years, logged) -0.235∗∗ -0.204∗∗ -0.187∗∗ -0.199∗∗ -0.150∗∗
(0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.051) (0.052)
Related industry experience, 2-digit (years, logged) -0.127∗ -0.107∗
(0.051) (0.052)
Top management experience (years, logged) -0.077
(0.078)
Parent firm age (logged) -0.144∗∗ -0.122∗∗
(0.040) (0.040)
Parent firm size (5 yr avg, logged) 0.032† 0.023
(0.019) (0.019)
Parent firm return on assets (5 yr avg, logged) 0.049† 0.036
(0.029) (0.029)
How many of the initial employees were 0.189
close family? (0.144)
How many of the initial employees were 0.033
former colleagues? (0.128)
Employees labor market experience (years, logged) -0.258∗∗ -0.236∗∗
(0.058) (0.049)
Employees 4-digit industry experience (years, logged) -0.077
(0.127)
How important was unemployment or a resignation 0.230∗∗ 0.165∗
to your decision to start a business? (0.074) (0.074)
How important is it that your work fits your skills -0.020
and abilities? (0.072)
Within the last five years, has your job required -0.288∗∗ -0.272∗∗
you to work during vacation or holidays? (0.044) (0.044)
Constant -8.353∗∗ -8.032∗∗ -8.519∗∗ -7.836∗∗ -7.463∗∗
(0.131) (0.150) (0.278) (0.268) (0.227)
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -1,396 -1,382 -1,376 -1,371 -1,346
Chi-squared 61.19 90.57 100.65 111.18 161.93
Observations 4,696 4,696 4,696 4,696 4,696
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Models 6 through 9 then enter those factors that distinguished spinoff entrepreneurs
from non-spinoff founders. Several of these factors appear unrelated to startup performance.
Somewhat surprisingly, though the coefficient on prior managerial experience has a negative
sign, suggesting that it might increase survival rates, the standard errors around this estimate
do not allow us to reject the possibility that managerial experience had no effect on survival.
Parent firm size and profitability also have weak relationships, at best, to the performance of
their progeny. Most of the differences in recruiting patterns also appear to have little effect
on startup performance.
In total, only five of the eleven variables distinguishing spinoff and non-spinoff en-
trepreneurs correlated significantly with startup performance. Founder experience in related
industries reduced the failure rates of their ventures. Since spinoff entrepreneurs more com-
monly had experience in related industries as well, this effect accounted for a portion of the
spinoff advantage. Entrepreneurs who had previously worked in older firms also had lower
failure rates. That’s somewhat surprising because previous research had found entrepreneurs
coming from smaller (and presumably younger) firms to have lower failure rates (Sørensen
and Phillips 2011). It also means that estimates of the performance advantages associated
with spinoffs may sometimes underestimate those benefits because spinoff entrepreneurs, on
average, come from younger organizations (a disadvantage).
Having employees with more work experience overall also had a positive relationship
with firm performance. But again, surprisingly, it did not seem to matter in what industry
employees had gained their experience. Experience in the same industry had no more value
than experience in other industries.
Finally, entrepreneurs motives for starting their own businesses also correlated with firm
performance. Those who became entrepreneurs because they had experienced a spell of un-
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employment had ventures with higher failure rates. Lesser abilities may account for both
their earlier loss of a job and the later failure of their firms. Since non-spinoff entrepreneurs
more frequently experienced these spells of unemployment prior to starting their firms, se-
lection on abilities therefore may account for a portion of the spinoff advantage.
Entrepreneurs willing to work on holidays and vacations also had lower failure rates.
That’s not surprising. One would generally expect a positive relationship between effort
and performance. But again, since spinoff entrepreneurs reported forgoing these leisure days
more frequently, this too may account for part of the positive performance associated with
prior experience in the industry.
Together, these factors appeared to account for roughly one-third of the spinoff advantage,
as the coefficient for industry experience declines substantially after controlling for these
differences between spinoff and non-spinoff entrepreneurs. But founder industry experience
continued to have a direct, positive relationship on the performance of their firms. Why?
One possibility is that the factors that we explore do completely mediate the relationship
between industry experience and performance but that measurement error prevents us from
adequately controlling for these factors (Judd and Kenny 1981). Another is that we have
omitted some important mechanism captured by the residual differential.
A third (likely) possibility is that industry-specific organizational and technical knowl-
edge accounts for much of this effect. Though our data have the advantage of allowing us
to consider many mechanisms not observed in early research on spinoffs, our cross-sectional
design has a disadvantage with respect to assessing certain types of industry-specific knowl-
edge, such as technical knowledge. Since measures of this knowledge are often quite specific
to the industry, such as areal density in disk drives (Agarwal et al. 2004), they do not lend
themselves to studies that span whole sectors of the economy (for an exception, however,
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see Feldman et al. 2012). Given our inability to measure this knowledge transfer directly, we
consider it quite likely that the transfer of this industry-specific knowledge might account
for a good share of the residual value of industry experience in our estimates.
Discussion
Drawing on unique data from Denmark, we found that spinoff entrepreneurs differed from
non-spinoff entrepreneurs in numerous ways. Spinoff entrepreneurs had less managerial ex-
perience but more experience both in the industry they entered and in related ones. Spinoff
entrepreneurs had previously been employed in smaller, younger and more profitable firms.
When starting their businesses, spinoff entrepreneurs recruited as early employees fewer from
their family and more who had previously been co-workers. Spinoff entrepreneurs also ap-
peared to work harder and to care less about having a job with flexible hours. They also
had been less likely to enter entrepreneurship from a spell of unemployment.
Only a few of these differences, however, appeared to contribute to the better performance
of spinoffs. Notably, the recruitment of more experienced employees, having not had a
prior spell of unemployment and exerting greater effort each accounted for a portion of
the performance benefits associated with prior experience in the industry. But, even after
accounting for these differences, spinoffs still outperformed non-spinoffs.
Though our results could not isolate one particular mechanism that accounted for the
outperformance of spinoffs, they do usefully inform many of the hypotheses that have been
forwarded for this effect. For example, one prominent claim has been that spinoffs originate
from employees who have had disputes with management about the appropriate strategic
direction of the companies for which they work. When they cannot convince management
to adopt their visions, they pursue them on their own (e.g., Garvin 1983; Klepper 2007;
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Thompson and Chen 2011; Klepper and Thompson 2010). Though anecdotal accounts sug-
gest that this scenario does occur occasionally, on average, entrepreneurs rarely reported
disagreements as being an important factor in their decisions to start their firms, and spinoff
entrepreneurs appeared no more likely than non-spinoff entrepreneurs to have reported dis-
agreements as a motive.
Another claim about spinoffs has appeared in the literature on agglomeration, where
spinoffs have been seen as an important source of within-region spillovers as employees leave
the largest and most profitable established firms to start their own companies (Klepper
2007; Greenstone et al. 2010). Klepper (2007), for example, presents evidence that the
entrepreneurs in Detroit in the automobile industry had previously been employed at the
largest and most successful incumbents. As the story goes, these spinoff entrepreneurs had
access to the recipe for the “special sauce” from the most able firms in the industry and used
it to their advantage.
We nevertheless found little to support this idea. Human capital clearly matters. Survival
rates increased with both industry experience and related industry experience. But the value
of this industry experience did not seem to depend much on its source. Spinoffs may still
contribute importantly to agglomeration, as in Detroit. But the reason probably depends
more on the simple fact that having previously been employed in the industry means that
these entrepreneurs live in close proximity to incumbents and therefore they generally locate
their companies near to them (Sorenson and Audia 2000; Dahl and Sorenson 2009).
Our results also suggest at least two interesting avenues for future research, both on
spinoffs and on entrepreneurship more generally. First, we found that spinoff entrepreneurs
differed from non-spinoff entrepreneurs in who they recruited. At least some of these differ-
ences appeared to contribute to the performance advantages of spinoff entrepreneurs. Does
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this recruiting effect then represent a return on industry-specific social capital, knowledge
of who one would want to hire and the ability to convince them to join the venture? Or do
spinoff entrepreneurs simply have better ideas or other attributes that allow them to attract
more able employees? More broadly, one would want to know much more about which em-
ployee attributes prove most valuable to startups (and whether the same employees thrive
at both startups and established firms). Though both practitioners and academics would
generally agree that the success of startups depends in large part on the quality of its early
employees, relatively little systematic research has been done of this issue (for important
exceptions, see Ruef et al. 2003; Ruef 2010; Timmermans 2010, 2012).
Second, we found substantial evidence of selection not just in who becomes an en-
trepreneur but also in which industries they choose to entry. Those entering industries
in which they have prior experience appear likely to have interests and abilities that fit bet-
ter with the demands of those industries. They also seem willing to work harder. These
differences in who becomes a spinoff entrepreneur, moreover, appear to matter to startup
performance. With few exceptions (e.g., Nanda and Sørensen 2010; Dahl and Sorenson 2012;
Kulchina 2012), however, studies of entrepreneurs have paid relatively little attention to the
extent to which who becomes an entrepreneur, the industries and locations they choose and
how they structure their organizations may depend on differences in the people and the
social context of those involved.
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Appendix
Our study draws on a dataset created by connecting a representative cross-sectional survey of
1,446 first-time entrepreneurs in Denmark to longitudinal Danish census data—in particular,
the matched employee-employer database known by its Danish acronym, IDA. The survey
provides some insight into the motivations and startup activities of entrepreneurs while the
census data allow us to track entrepreneurs (and their employees) for 23 years prior to
entering into entrepreneurship and for four years following the establishment of their firms.
The survey comprised questions relevant to entrepreneurship from a number of well-
established instruments, such as the European Value Study, the General Enterprising Ten-
dency Test (GET2), the General Social Survey, and the survey on Factors of Business Success
(FOBS). It also included a number of novel additional questions on the extent to which en-
trepreneurs relied on social relationships for support in their startups. Dahl et al. (2009)
provides a complete description of the sampling, the survey design and question and the
responses received (Appendix G includes a copy of the complete survey instrument).
Statistics Denmark mailed out the survey in the spring of 2008, collected and coded the
responses, and linked the survey data to the IDA. It derived the sample for the questionnaire
on the basis of information from IDA. The sampling frame included all people living in
Denmark of working age (15 to 66 in 2004). The primary group for the survey, entrepreneurs,
comprised only those who had started a business in 2004 (N=6,799). Restricting this set to
those who had never previously founded a firm reduced the number eligible for the survey to
4,586. Statistics Denmark sent surveys to this entire population of first-time entrepreneurs
and received 1,446 completed questionnaires a 31.5% response rate). Statistics Denmark also
sent surveys to a secondary group, a matched random sample of non-entrepreneurs. Note,
however, that our analyses do not use any of the respondents from this comparison set.
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Because the original sample had been selected from the IDA data, Statistics Denmark
had extensive information on those who did not respond to the survey as well as those who
did. Nielsen (2011) analyzed and documented these differences in detail. His comparisons
revealed that female, older, married, native Danish, higher earning, more wealthy and more
educated individuals responded at significantly higher rates. However, these groups differed
little in terms of absolute differences in response rates. The large sample size simply meant
that he had substantial statistical power for precisely identifying even small differences.
Figure 3 depicts the hazard rates for the firms started by the spinoff and non-spinoff
survey respondents. Though the pattern here appears consistent with that observed in
the population as a whole (see Figure 1), it differs in two ways from the entire 1995-2004
population of entrepreneurs. First, the sample of respondents, both the spinoffs and the
non-spinoffs, had higher survival rates, on average. Second, in the sample of respondents,
spinoff and non-spinoff entrepreneur differed somewhat less in their performance than in the
population as a whole. Given these facts, our findings probably understate the differences
between spinoff and non-spinoff entrepreneurs.
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Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier survival plot for spinoffs (light) and non-spinoffs (dark) among
survey respondents.
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